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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND




There are many things one could say about the Clinton Administration’s
effect on the Constitution.  I am tempted to comment generally about the
Clinton Administration’s concern for constitutional values, but Dean Nichol has
already captured many of my feelings on that subject.1  In any event, my
assigned topic was a narrower one: the Clinton Administration’s impact on
speech in cyberspace.  I take as my starting point the bracing skepticism of
Professor Volokh’s paper on the same subject, a subject about which he has
considerable doubt:
I was asked to participate in this symposium by discussing the Clinton
Administration and free speech in cyberspace, and I will do so.  But inquiring into the
Clinton Administration’s role in cyberspace speech regulation may be asking the
wrong question.  I’m not sure that particular Administrations generally have much of
a direct impact on free speech law (as opposed to the indirect impact, often not seen
for decades, flowing from the decisions of the judges they appoint).  The Clinton
Administration, for instance, has mostly confronted free speech law incidentally and
sporadically; the high-profile direct attempts to seriously restrict speech, such as the
[Communications Decency Act], have largely come from Congress. 
Moreover, the words “in cyberspace” in the phrase “restrictions on free speech in
cyberspace” are generally, in my view, not terribly significant; the medium by and
large does not and should not affect the protection—or lack of protection—given to
the content.2
I am going to disagree, at least in emphasis, with most of these claims.  In
fact, there are interesting questions to be asked about the Clinton
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1. See Gene R. Nichol, Taking Economic Equality Off the Table, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
353 (Winter/Spring 2000).  A more jurisprudential approach might also be interesting.  A
deconstructionist could make much of the implicit structure of the political attacks on President
Clinton’s personality and his style of governance; both are asserted to have “constitutional” deficiencies
and the predominant critique is one central to conventional constitutional scholarship—the triumph of
expedient “policy” over higher “principle”—indicating the extent to which such divisions are central
even to our non-legal discourse about morality and politics.  See generally James Boyle, Anachronism
of the Moral Sentiments? Integrity, Post-modernism and Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 493 (1999).
2. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the Clinton
Administration, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 302 (Winter/Spring 2000).  Given his skepticism
about the topic, our papers diverge here, his going on to write about sexual harassment and mine
focusing on the tension between the First Amendment and current intellectual property policy.
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Administration’s role in cyberspace speech regulation.  Indeed, the actions of
this Administration have had and will continue to have a considerable impact
on both speech regulation in cyberspace, and on the law of the First
Amendment generally.  Finally, although Professor Volokh makes the valid
point that discussions of free speech should not be medium-specific, certain
particular features of cyberspace in general, and of the Clinton Administration’s
“plan” for cyberspace in particular, are likely to force the courts to confront a
series of tensions and omissions in First Amendment doctrine.  Admittedly, the
Clinton Administration’s role of “making” free speech law in some of these
cases is similar to the Nixon Administration’s role in “making” law on executive
privilege,3 another area in which the current Administration has excelled.4
However, both in terms of speech regulation and in terms of providing raw
material for the legal controversies that shape the law of the First Amendment,
the Clinton Administration’s legacy is considerable, and nowhere more than in
cyberspace.5
II
A WORLD WITHOUT SULLIVAN
The most visible examples of the Clinton Administration’s role in cyber-
speech regulation are the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”),6 which was
struck down by unanimous vote of the Supreme Court in 1997,7 and the Child
Online Protection Act (“COPA”),8 which is now before the courts.9  Both of
these pieces of legislation were supported by the Clinton Administration even
though the CDA had so many First Amendment problems it read like a law
school exam question, and the COPA, while much better drafted, is hardly
solicitous of speech on the Internet.10  In my view, Professor Volokh is a little
quick to let the Clinton Administration off the hook for its role in these bills;
others have certainly been more critical.11  Although the main impetus for the
3. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
4. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
5. I am not entirely sure whether Professor Volokh would disagree with my analysis.  He has
certainly written persuasively about the First Amendment analysis of intellectual property.  Eugene
Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases,
107 YALE L.J. 2431 (1998).
6. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B) (1996); id. § 233(d)(1) (1998).
7. See ACLU v. Reno I, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
8. Child Online Protection Act, 14 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1406, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998).
9. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno II, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (1999).
10. My students and I have analyzed the constitutional problems of both of these pieces of
legislation at some length.  For the CDA, see Before the Supreme Un-Court of the United States (visited
Mar. 22, 2000) <http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/faculty/boyle/unreno.htm>. For the COPA, see
Before the Supreme Un-Court of the United States (visited Mar. 22, 2000)
<http://www.law.yale.edu/censor/uncopa.htm>.
11. An article by Floyd Abrams, the noted First Amendment lawyer, provides a fairly typical
assessment:
At 10 a.m. on March 19, the nine justices of the United States Supreme Court walked to their
leather chairs, which faced the attorneys before them.  On one side of a podium were lawyers
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legislation came from the Congress, not from the Administration, the President
publicly supported and signed both bills without any apparent qualms, which is
itself quite striking.  Even if one believes strongly in the desirability and
constitutionality of the regulation of minors’ online access to indecent material,
both prudence and institutional responsibility argue for some level of
constitutional scrutiny before the President signs a particular bill; under normal-
science constitutional analysis, the CDA was so palpably unconstitutional that
the Clinton Administration garners little credit on either front.  As soon as the
Court ruled, however, President Clinton characteristically “praised the court’s
decision to protect free speech and expression on the Internet,”12 as though the
First Amendment issue had not been mentioned to him before.  The
Administration subsequently distanced itself from the bill in favor of a declared
“hands-off” regulatory style under the unlikely, but competent, leadership of
Ira Magaziner.13
Nevertheless, Professor Volokh is correct to say that the Clinton
Administration was not the effective moving force for either piece of
legislation.  Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that in terms of traditional, direct
attempts to regulate speech on the Internet, the Clinton Administration has not
had a large impact.  
It is at this point, however, that I must part company with Professor Volokh.
On a broader and perhaps more significant level, the Clinton Administration
has played a large role in the law and policy of online speech regulation both by
sponsoring and administering regulatory initiatives, and by creating the
controversies that will shape First Amendment jurisprudence over the next
fifteen to twenty years.
To set up my argument, I must ask you to engage in a thought experiment.
Imagine the law of the First Amendment without New York Times v. Sullivan14
for a coalition of civil liberties and computer-industry groups prepared to argue that the
Communications Decency Act signed into law by President Clinton last year violated the First
Amendment.  Standing on the other side, ready to defend the constitutionality of the law,
were lawyers for Attorney General Janet Reno and, by extension, President Clinton himself.
From any First Amendment perspective, it was a depressingly familiar sight. Government
lawyers routinely defend governmental conduct.  But it has become the norm, not the
exception, for Clinton Administration lawyers to find themselves minimizing First
Amendment interests and defending laws or policies that maximize threats to free expression.
Time and again, the Administration has opposed serious First Amendment claims in court,
acquiesced in serious First Amendment damage by legislation and ignored First Amendment
limits in its own conduct.  Even when the Administration has raised First Amendment
concerns, it has done so haltingly and briefly.
Floyd Abrams, Clinton vs. the First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1997, § 6, at 42.
12. Supreme Court Strikes Down Communications Decency Act; Law Unduly Curbs Free Speech,
FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, July 3, 1997, at A1, 473, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Facts File.
13. Matt Pottinger, White House Rejects Communications Decency Act; Outlines Strategy for
Internet Commerce, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, SNS File.
As I will show later, the hands-off approach did not extend to intellectual property.  See infra text
accompanying notes 17–24.
14. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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and its progeny.15  Imagine that the Court had rejected—or never clearly
faced—the claim that the First Amendment could somehow require a
constitutional modification to the substantive law of defamation in every state,
a “federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”16  After all,
Sullivan was a civil lawsuit between private parties, enforcing a facially neutral
law that gave no special privileges to incumbents or state officials.  True, given
the difficulty of verifying every statement, a particular background regime of
libel law might, in practice, allow incumbents or state officials to stifle the
speech of critics or journalists.  Where the threat of litigation did not suffice,
libel law might even allow officials to use state power to silence their
opponents.  But if this is enough to qualify as state action, enough to require a
specific constitutionally mandated modification to the substantive private law of
every state, has not the court returned to the supposed excesses of Shelley v.
Kraemer?17
In this Sullivan-less world, then, imagine an administration that moved
decisively to “strengthen” the law of defamation, federalizing large chunks of it,
dramatically expanding the definition of defamation, the remedies available to
those defamed, and the list of parties who might be held contributorily or
vicariously liable.  The definition of reputational injury could be broadened,
proof requirements eased, the right against defamation made to survive the
death of the person defamed, the plaintiff given injunctive rights to stop
publication and even the right to seize any computer that might have been used
to defame or was likely to be used to defame someone in the future.  Imagine
also that this administration, faced with the dramatic expansion of the Internet,
made protection against defamation its key policy initiative both domestically
and internationally, encouraging other nations to adopt similarly expansive
definitions of defamation and threatening those that did not with trade
sanctions.  Online service providers could be made strictly liable for defamation
committed by their users; anonymity (long a tool of the slanderer) could be
discouraged by technical standards backed by the power of the federal
government’s purchasing power and perhaps even imposed by force of law.
The administration would argue that without security against reputational
injury, commerce and speech on the Internet are unlikely to flourish—who
would venture online without a legal guarantee that they are secure from the
15. See, e.g., Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (applying the logic of Sullivan to intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (requiring
a private plaintiff to show falsity of an allegedly libelous statement to recover damages); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (expanding public figure concept); see also Wolston v.
Reader’s Digest Ass’n Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
16. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
17. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).  The importance of Sullivan’s treatment of state action was pointed out 35
years ago by my colleague William Van Alstyne.  See William W. Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black,
Constitutional Review and the Talisman of State Action, 1965 DUKE L.J. 219.   
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words of the malicious, or simply the careless?  The administration might even
propose federal legislation and international treaties that would define new
types of reputational interests, promising a constellation of entirely new legal
protections surrounding the traditional law of libel and slander.
My point is that, even if we lacked the rules laid down in Sullivan, we would
see clearly that our hypothetical administration was implicated in a set of
dramatic regulations of speech, and cyber-speech in particular.  The effects of
these regulations would not be simple, of course.  Using the law to guarantee
freedom from reputational injury might actually encourage some people to join
the debate who otherwise would remain on the sidelines.  It might also
sometimes force journalists to be more careful, thereby improving the quality of
the debate.  Thus, the administration’s plan would not be a dead weight loss on
speech; it would have benefits as well as costs.  Moreover, the administration
could not be blamed for the absence of the line of doctrine we trace back to
Sullivan, though it could be held responsible for failure to take the speech-costs
of its policies into account.
Despite these possible excuses, it seems likely that the civil libertarian
community would give both this expansion of defamation law and the
administration that proposed it a very low grade on the bell curve of First
Amendment virtue.  More interestingly, perhaps, such changes of defamation
law, coupled with their particularly intrusive impact on the citizen-publishers of
cyberspace, would surely end up forcing the Court to revisit the relationship
between defamation and the First Amendment.  Thus, in two distinct ways, our
fantasy administration would have direct impact on the law of free speech.  Its
defamation regulations would dramatically burden speech, while the added
intrusiveness of those regulations in the context of cyberspace would force the
Court to take the conflict between defamation law and the First Amendment
seriously.
Fortunately, all of this is no fantasy.  Change the “civil lawsuit between
private parties” from a defamation case to an intellectual property case and
everything I have described is simple reality.  The last eight years have seen a
striking expansion of intellectual property law, in ways that significantly burden
speech, and the Clinton Administration has played a major, and thoroughly
discreditable, role in the process.  Indeed, if one focuses on all of the
Administration’s  proposals—successful, unsuccessful, and currently pending—
a remarkable picture emerges, a picture in which concern for First Amendment
values seems entirely over-shadowed by a commitment to intellectual property
maximalism.  All the defamation law “reforms” I mentioned—liability for
online service providers, extension of the scope, reach, and term of rights,
increases in criminal penalties and civil damage awards, attempts to prohibit or
discourage speech-technologies that could be used to facilitate anonymous
defamation, restriction of fair use—have their counterparts in the Clinton
Administration’s intellectual property proposals.
The Clinton Administration gave an early lead in all matters relating to
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intellectual property to the Commerce Department’s Patent and Trademark
Office (“PTO”), which proceeded to go on a binge of protectionism.  The PTO
supported extensions of copyright, patent, and trademark, the creation of
entirely new intellectual property rights to cover facts, the criminalization of
devices that might be used to threaten copyright protection systems (even if
they had other legitimate uses), the use of trade treaties to enforce and extend a
maximalist view of intellectual property outside the United States, and the trade
sanctions to back up that view.18  Some of these measures had fairly obvious
implications for speech.  For example, one claim of the Clinton Administration
White Paper was that Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) were strictly liable for
copyright violations committed by their subscribers.19  This was a fairly strange
account of existing law offline, and stranger still as a prescription for the world
of the Internet.  After all, in other contexts, First Amendment law has always
had a great solicitude for the role of distributors in the political economy of
speech.  As a result, it has repeatedly rejected the idea of imposing strict
liability on them, whether in libel, obscenity, or elsewhere.20  Why should we
assume that in copyright law strict liability for distributors did not raise exactly
the same concerns?
The Clinton Administration also supported a “Database Treaty,” which
would have introduced into American law a quasi-property right over facts.21  In
the face of intense resistance, much of it focusing on the devastating effect such
a regime could have on research, debate, and public discourse, the treaty
proposal was dropped but a domestic bill was immediately introduced in its
place.22  The examples go on and on, ranging from the PTO’s support for far-
18. See Jonathan Band & Taro Isshiki, The New Anti-Circumvention Provision in the Copyright
Act:  A Flawed First Step, 3 CYBERSPACE L. 2 (1999); James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online:
a Young Person’s Guide, 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 47, 58 (1996); Jessica Litman, Symposium, Copyright
Owners’ Rights and Users’ Privileges on the Internet:  Reforming Information Law in Copyright’s Image,
22 DAYTON L. REV. 587 (1997); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED 4.01, Jan. 1996, at
134; James Boyle, Overregulating the Internet, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1995, at A17; James Boyle, Sold
Out, NY TIMES, Mar. 31, 1996, at E15.
19. See Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy, supra note 18, at 58.
20. For example, take the following analysis of the effects of strict liability online, taken from a
libel case, which in turn, quoted an analysis from an obscenity case.
The requirement that a distributor must have knowledge of the contents of a publication
before liability can be imposed for distributing that publication is deeply rooted in the First
Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. “The
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of speech and of the press stand in the way of
imposing” strict liability on  distributors for the contents of the reading materials they carry.
Cubby, Inc., v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (1991) (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 152-53 (1959)).  Under pressure from ISPs and others, and in the face of clear skepticism from the
judiciary and from scholars and activists, the proposal was dropped.  See Jennifer E. Markiewicz,
Seeking Shelter from the MP3 Storm: How Far Does the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Online
Service Provide Liability Reach?, 7. COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 423 (1999).
21. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent
Developments  and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793 (1999).
22. For a fine explanation of the problems with the legislation, see William Patry, The Enumerated
Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property:  An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 359, 360-68 (1999).  The most recent version is the Collection of Information Anti-Piracy Act,
H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999).
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reaching, anti-dilution trademark legislation that could reduce parody and
criticism of famous companies, to the regulation of domain names on the
Internet, to the attack on fair use and first sale in the digital context, or the
extension of the copyright term.23  All of these proposals have clear First
Amendment problems, problems that one would expect officials to agonize
over, even if they ultimately found them insufficiently weighty to doom the
proposal in question.  In fact, however, the PTO’s actual comments were
dismissive whenever free speech issues were raised.  For example, Bruce
Lehman, Commissioner of Patents, testified that
[t]he First Amendment has always provided a completely different standard with
regard to liability for actions that constitute speech as compared to actions that
constitute  copyright  infringement.  They’re really just apples and oranges.  And I
think it would disserve both areas of law—I know there’s been some discussion, some
people have attempted to link these two areas of law recently, and I think it does a
disservice to both areas of law, even though the same technologies may be involved.
And I think it really does a disservice both  to the law of the  First Amendment and
the law of copyright to attempt really to try to analogize from one to the other.24
Property isn’t speech regulation; it’s definitional.  Of course, Mr. Sullivan said
the same thing about libel law.
Admittedly, this account of the Clinton Administration’s role is a little
oversimplified.  Administrations are not monolithic.  The Bureau of Standards’
National Telecommunication and Information Agency (“NTIA”) was initially
given a high profile in the Clinton Administration’s plans for the information
age and, from my conversations with officials in that agency, seemed concerned
by the effects of intellectual property maximalism.  Unfortunately, the NTIA
proved unable to compete with the larger and better connected bureaucratic
players.  Soon, rather like Al Gore, but with less credibility, it was reduced to
stressing its own importance to the Internet.25
The FTC and the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division proved rather
more skeptical about the unvarying menu of intellectual property expansion.
Both political appointees and civil servants outside the PTO saw the danger of
anti-competitive effects, costs to consumers and market concentration,
particularly in the context of computer networks, where concern about “lock-
in” effects and path dependency were being popularized by the Microsoft case.
To some extent, these countervailing forces prevented the Administration’s
23. See, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2627; Keith Aoki, How the World Dreams Itself to be American: Reflections on the Relationship between
the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and Free Speech Norms, 17 LOYOLA L.A. ENT. L.J. 523,
528-31 (1997); Diane K. Wong, Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 245
(2000); Eldred v. Reno (last updated Aug. 24, 2000) <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cc/opinion.html>.
24. NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Joint Hearing on H.R. 2441 and S. 1284 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Comm. and the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (testimony of Bruce Lehman, Commissioner of Patents), quoted
in Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright’s Image, 22 DAYTON L. REV. 587, 588
(1997).
25. I am at a loss to know how to provide footnote support for this shameless reliance on anecdote,
gossip, and personal experience.  Presumably, I should write a newspaper article asserting it, which I
could then cite as textual evidence.
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Internet strategy from being completely dominated by an agenda of intellectual
property maximalism.  Nevertheless, it is worth noting two things.  First, these
countervailing forces were largely concentrated around the potential negative
economic effects of intellectual property expansion rather than their effects
upon speech tout seul, though the two aspects are linked, of course.  Second,
even within the economic realm, the links between antitrust policy and
intellectual property were imperfectly understood.26
During 1999, for example, we were treated to the sight of the Clinton
Administration simultaneously trumpeting the importance—given network
effects—of devoting significant government resources to prosecuting Microsoft
for violating the antitrust laws, and championing intellectual property
expansions that would make it much easier for the next generation of
Microsofts to maintain just such a dominant position in the future.  Thus, even
in the economic realm, the potential dangers that expansive intellectual
property rights present were only inconsistently recognized, and the potential
effects upon speech were not recognized at all.
There are exceptions to this statement.  When the United States proposed a
new treaty covering intellectual property rights in databases at the World
Intellectual Property Organization, senior Administration science officials seem
to have played an important role in explaining the depth of opposition to the
proposal among researchers and civil liberties groups.27  When a domestic
counterpart to this proposal was introduced, the Office of Legal Counsel
(“OLC”) issued a particularly fine memorandum to Congress questioning its
constitutionality on a number of grounds.28  Slowly, things may be getting even
better.  But the overall record is clear and, in speech terms at least, remains a
pretty dismal one.
At some point, if this pattern continues to hold, the second part of my
prediction may come to pass:  The Supreme Court will be forced to confront the
tensions between intellectual property law and the First Amendment.  Already,
the extremism of the Administration’s proposals and the severity of their
impact on promising new speech technologies has prompted new attention to
constitutional issues in the intellectual property area.  In addition to the OLC
memo, there was a court challenge to copyright term extension, which raises
public trust, copyright clause, and First Amendment issues.29  In fact, the next
ten years is likely to present a flowering of constitutional litigation of
intellectual property questions, addressing exactly the imbalance described
26. See James Boyle, Missing the Point on Microsoft, SALON (Apr. 7, 2000)
<http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/04/07/greenspan/index.html>.
27. See Louis Jacobson, Dueling Over Data, 30 NAT’L L.J. 64, No. 2, (1998); Robert M. White,
Taking on the Database Challenge—and Winning, 100 TECH. REV. 65 (1997).
28. See Memorandum from William Michael Treanor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, to William P. Marshall, Associate White House Counsel
23 (July 28, 1998) [hereinafter OLC Memo].
29. See  <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/legaldocs.html> (last updated Aug. 24, 2000).
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above in the analogy to New York Times v. Sullivan.30  This litigation will be
driven, above all, by a particularly toxic combination: the lack of balance in the
maximalist intellectual property policies of recent years, the degree to which
those policies, when applied online, will actually burden the quotidian speech
and research of ordinary citizens, and the geometric increase in economic
importance of intellectual property rights in a networked information society.31
In other words, we have had an increase in the level of intellectual property
rights, a technologically-driven increase in the burden each of those rights
imposes on an average citizen, and a raising of the economic stakes involved.
The main barrier to the challenges that will inevitably arise is the constitutional
exceptionalism around intellectual property. Why is the treatment of
intellectual property so anomalous?
III
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
There is no case—no single pronouncement—that speaks to the First
Amendment constraints on intellectual property law with the simple authority
of New York Times v. Sullivan.  There are certainly nods and becks in the right
direction: Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,32 Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,33 and a few other cases have provocative snippets that
suggest, for example, that it would not be constitutional for Congress to
eliminate the fair use privilege in copyright law.  At moments it also seems as
though the Court is saying that the distinction between idea (non-
commodifiable) and expression (commodifiable) has constitutional as well as
statutory authority behind it, but these cases are the exception rather than the
norm in the Court’s intellectual property jurisprudence.
Thus, for example, Congress conveyed the exclusive right to promotional
uses of the word “Olympic” to the United States Olympic Committee
(“USOC”), which then used that right to prevent a non-profit corporation, San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (“SFAA”), from organizing a “Gay Olympic
Games.”34  The Court concluded that the First Amendment was not implicated,
either by the original grant or by its subsequent use.35  Applying a relaxed, not
to say supine, standard of review to the initial legislation, the Court analyzed
the issue as one of property rights, not free speech.  In words that are strikingly
different from those of Sullivan, the Court dismissed any associated collateral
damage to free expression:
30. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
31. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS; LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY ix-16 (1996).
32. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
33. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
34. 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1978).
35. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.  v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522,
538-42 (1987).
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The mere fact that the SFAA claims an expressive, as opposed to a purely
commercial, purpose does not give it a First Amendment right to “appropriat[e] to
itself the harvest of those who have sown.” The USOC’s right to prohibit use of the
word “Olympic” in the promotion of athletic events is at the core of its legitimate
property right.36
A similar argument, of course, would tell us that
the mere fact that the signatories of the offending advertisement in Sullivan claimed
they were criticising a government official rather than  maliciously bad-mouthing a
neighbour does not give them the First Amendment right to utter falsehoods that
destroy a man’s reputation, his dearest jewel.  Mr. Sullivan’s right to prevent the
spread of injurious falsehood about him lies at the very core of his legitimate
reputational right. 37
And yet that is exactly the argument the Court in Sullivan rejected.
In fact, of course, the two cases are different; the state libel law in Sullivan
was facially neutral, while Congress created through special legislation a
unique property right over the word “Olympic,” a right held only by the USOC
and not subject to the normal defenses in a trademark case.  But these
differences hardly shore up the court’s reasoning in the Gay Olympics case,
quite the reverse.
Having divided the case into two parts—(1) a review of a facially neutral law
conveying a property right, and (2) a private action seeking enforcement of that
property right through the courts—the Supreme Court could then declare that
there was no state action involved in enforcing the USOC’s property right
against the SFAA:
Most fundamentally, this Court has held that a government “normally can be held
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must
in law be deemed to be that of the [government].”. . . The USOC’s choice of how to
enforce its exclusive right to use the word “Olympic” simply is not a governmental
decision.  There is no evidence that the Federal Government coerced or encouraged
the USOC in the exercise of its right.  At most, the Federal Government, by failing to
supervise the USOC’s use of its rights, can be said to exercise “[m]ere approval of or
acquiescence in the initiatives” of the USOC.  This is not enough to make the USOC’s
actions those of the Government.38
It is striking to compare these words with the equivalent passage from
Sullivan:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have
applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on
their constitutional freedoms of speech and press.  It matters not that that law has
been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by
state statute. . . . The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but,
whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.39
36. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. at 541 (citing International News Service v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918)).
37. I am told that I should insert a footnote here to point out that this is not a real quotation,
merely a hypothetical transposition of the Court’s argument in SFAA to the facts of Sullivan.
38. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. at. 546-47 (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1004-05 (1982)).
39. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265.
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This must surely lead one to ask whether courts applying intellectual property
rules will be applying “rule[s] of law which . . . impose invalid restrictions on . . .
constitutional freedoms of speech and press.”  Many courts have treated this
question as a simple one, but it is hardly that.40
The laws of intellectual property affect freedom of speech in a number of
distinct ways.  First, and most importantly, intellectual property laws may
promote speech.  By adding “the fuel of interest to the fire of genius,”41 these
laws may encourage the production of literary, artistic, scientific, political, and
other works, enrich public debate, and allow the iconoclast and the dissenter to
dream of supporting themselves by creating works and then selling them in the
marketplace.  “[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be an engine of free
expression.  By establishing a marketable right to use one’s expression,
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”42
Of course, there are other incentive systems for the production of such works,
ranging from altruism and the love of sharing one’s work to the search for
reputation and to other indirect market benefits.  The importance of intellectual
property here is in promoting the work that is at the margin, the work that
would not be created but for the market leverage conferred on the creator by
the bundle of intellectual property rights.  Intellectual property also encourages
speech in another way:43  It offers rights-owners some degree of continuing
control over their works, a guarantee of semiotic stability, which might lead a
speaker or thinker or artist to make a precious work public, secure in the
knowledge that he may call on the state to forbid others from transforming its
meaning in certain ways.  Of course, as Rebecca Tushnet points out in a fine
recent paper, the fact that intellectual property may encourage some speech
does not end the question of the constitutionality of a particular intellectual
property rule.  Hate speech regulation may encourage the speech of some as it
regulates the speech of others.  That is hardly thought to settle the question of
its constitutionality.44  Incentive effects are not the end of the story; intellectual
property also restrains speech.
40. For example, one still hears the argument that, because the Constitution grants power to
Congress to create a copyright system, any particular copyright law cannot be inconsistent with the
First Amendment.  By this logic, since the Constitution gives Congress the power to levy taxes, any
tax—including one aimed solely at African-Americans—would be immune from scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause.  Some copyright regimes may be constitutional; that does not mean that all
copyright regimes must be.
41. The words were actually used by Lincoln to describe the operation of the patent rather than the
copyright system.  Speech by Abraham Lincoln to the Springfield, Ill., Library Ass’n (Feb. 2, 1860), in
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 113 (John G. Nicolay & John Hays eds., 1905).
42. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).  But see
Stephen Fraser, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and Its Impact on the
Internet, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 19-20 (1998) (arguing that this is probably an inaccurate
account of the original understanding of copyright).
43. Neil Netanel would add to this list the beneficial speech-effects of copyright: its function in
supporting “a sector of creative and communicative activity that is relatively free of state subsidy, elite
patronage, and cultural hierarchy.”  Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,
106 YALE L.J. 283, 288 (1996).
44. See Rebecca Tushnet, The Engine of Free Expression (forthcoming article).
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First, in the simplest sense, intellectual property rights allow individuals to
call upon the state to prevent someone from speaking or expressing themselves
in a particular way.  This may involve a simple refusal to let the speaker use
some sign, signifier or text in their message, or it may involve a refusal to let
them transform it in some way, whether contextually or otherwise.45  In either
case, this type of effect strikes most directly at the person who cannot
paraphrase around the restraints posed by intellectual property, who needs to
use the particular text or sign in question to convey her message.  For example,
the San Francisco Arts and Athletics Association wants to assert its right to link
its community with the noble ideals and images of the Olympic games.
Running a “Gay Faux-Greek Athletic Thingamajig” just isn’t the same.  The
Nation magazine wishes to use President Ford’s own words from his
autobiography in describing his decision to pardon President Nixon.46  In each of
these cases, it is precisely the authenticity of the sign or the words that the
speaker feels is crucial to his speech.
Like most legal regimes, intellectual property’s restraints may run beyond
the actual limits of the legal rights themselves, particularly where the threat of
suit is used by powerful individuals and organizations against those without
access to lawyers or the money to command their talents.  A judge in one of the
Church of Scientology’s many intellectual property cases observed that
“[a]lthough the [Religious Technology Center] brought the complaint under
traditional secular concepts of copyright and trade secret law, it has become
clear that a much broader  motivation prevailed—the stifling of criticism and
dissent of the religious practices of Scientology and the destruction of its
opponents.”47  The effects of chill may be particularly important to free speech
doctrine on the Internet.  There, the well-funded media plaintiffs who have
played such a role in establishing free speech law give way to the “citizen-
publishers” of cyberspace who have no such resources.48
Beyond this familiar chilling effect lies the possibility of using intellectual
property as an indirect restraint on speech, to deny the speaker access to his or
her chosen channel of communication.  Copyright infringement, in particular, is
often declared to be a strict liability tort.  If one cannot use the threat of
litigation to discourage the speaker, it may be possible to threaten the speaker’s
internet service provider with contributory infringement,49 or to sue Network
45. For good examples of both tendencies in the Scientology cases, see Church of Scientology Int’l
v. Fishman, 35 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 1994); New Era Publishers, Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d
Cir. 1989); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
F.A.C.T. NET, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1468 (D. Colo. 1995); Religious Tech. Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communic. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
46. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539.
47. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. at 1377-78.
48. The Supreme Court has indicated that the financial and practical burden of complying with
particular legal rules are an important First Amendment consideration.  See, e.g., Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (noting the effect of lengthy litigation processes on a film censored
because it was not properly submitted to the State Board of Censors).
49. Though the Digital Millennium Copyright Act gives a qualified immunity to ISPs, it conditions
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Solutions for failing to change a domain name that allegedly infringes a
trademark.
Intellectual property regimes, particularly online, may have more subtle
effects in shaping the architecture, political economy, and structure of
preferences in our speech universe.  Some intellectual property thinkers,
including a number in government employ, would like to see intellectual
property protections explicitly redefined by, for example, commodifying facts,
restricting fair use, and abolishing first sale.  Their goal is to move toward a pay-
only-per-view universe, in which the Internet’s efficiencies are used to allow for
the levying of microcharges on every use of information, rather than the cruder,
but also looser system we have now, with its broad range of free, subsidized,
borrowed, and second-hand sources.  Of course, pay-per-view, or per screen,
would indeed allow for sophisticated price discrimination by content providers,
perhaps providing high-quality access to the wealthy.50  One wonders though,
what the price to the universe of speech would be.  After all, information is hard
to value before one has it, particularly when one’s resources are limited and
one’s ability to experiment thereby constrained.  Much of learning is
serendipitous and unplanned, and the pursuit of apparently non-productive
knowledge is both inherently pleasurable and practically useful.  One’s current
preferences are formed by one’s past experiences and those, in turn, are shaped
by the costs of experimentation, on which legal rules may have a considerable
influence.51  Does one really want to make it harder (and more expensive) for
the poor child to learn that “aimless browsing” may be a very smart move
indeed, or for the next auto-didact to pursue the meandering course of
intellectual development that produces a new synthesis or a striking point of
view?
Moreover, if one wants to move to a world in which reading someone else’s
e-books may be a contract violation, and possibly a crime, the anonymous,
decentralized, and protean architecture of the Internet itself starts to seem like
a bug rather than a feature.  Architectures, whether real or virtual, are
powerfully influenced by the underlying structure of rights and markets, as well
as by technological feasibility.  The suburb, the mall, and the tenement are all
based in part around the social organization of work, life, and market, an
organization in which property regimes have an important role.  It would be
ironic indeed if the openness and resistance to centralized public or private
control that makes the Internet so attractive as a medium for the distribution of
that immunity on a set of complaint and removal procedures that are hardly designed to encourage
speech.  See Digital Millenium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860.
50. For an argument that the government could condition an increased (and socially beneficial)
ability to price discriminate on the acceptance by rightsholders of a variety of limitations of intellectual
property rights in the public interest, see William W. Fisher III, Symposium on the Internet and Legal
Theory: Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203 (1998).  For an argument
that intellectual property law itself already operates to facilitate certain broad classes of price
discrimination, see Wendy J. Gordon, Symposium on the Internet and Legal Theory: Intellectual
Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998).
51. The assumption of exogenous preferences notwithstanding.
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speech,52 or as a persistent social space, were to be whittled away in the name of
facilitating a particular business plan for making money off content, and the
expansionist intellectual property rights on which that plan depends.  Rather
than being the engine of free expression, copyright would be the nemesis of the
structures that permit such expression.
IV
CONCLUSION
My argument here has had a double goal.  On the one hand, using the
analogy of New York Times v. Sullivan, I have argued that courts and scholars
should look more critically at the consistency of particular intellectual property
rules with the First Amendment.  With or without the Clinton Administration,
inside or outside of cyberspace, this reexamination is a necessary one.  We need
a Sullivan for intellectual property.  On the other hand, I want to stress the
particular role that both the Clinton Administration and cyberspace have to
play in this story. Because the executive branch has a strong impact on
intellectual property policy, both domestically and internationally, one must
amend Professor Volokh’s conclusion that particular administrations do not
have much of a role in speech regulation.  The Clinton Administration really
52. A critic might say at this point, “This sounds like a definitionalist First Amendment absolutism,
in which ‘regulation’ of speech is always bad and all the interesting questions about speech are either
ignored, assumed, or explained away.”  That is not my position ( I hope), but like a number of scholars
who are sometimes critical of conventional First Amendment analysis, I find that, in the online world,
the ACLU and I are much more likely to agree.  Why?  The question is a good one, and deserves a
better answer than I give here.  Broadly speaking, my answer is that the Internet is different in
important respects from other communications media.  First, as a communications medium, it is more
resistant (though certainly not immune) to both private and public power than is broadcasting or the
daily newspaper.  Thus, the cure of “more speech” is not as hollow as it might be in a world where
ordinary citizens cannot hope to publish their opinions.  I don’t want to make too much of this
difference—Disney can still drown out http://www.rtmark.com—but there is a difference.  Second,
unlike other media, effective regulation of the Internet almost has to be technological in nature and
global in scope.  Thus, the architecture you put in place to ensure that teens in Schenectady cannot see
indecent images will be available to stop activists in Senegal and Singapore from getting access to
information on birth control, or government corruption, or the comparative infant mortality rates of
boys and girls. Whatever one’s views on speech, this point matters.  If, by proposing a municipal
ordinance in the Midwest on images degrading to women, a feminist activist automatically granted an
additional level of coercive power over Afghan women’s dress and education to the Taliban, she might
well think twice before proceeding.  This kind of unintended technical generalization over the globe is
not the same as the normative universalization that Kantian morals prescribe, or the hypothetical
generalization over different viewpoints or types of speech that First Amendment scholars have always
used to restrain those eager to regulate speech (“Would you support such a rule if it could be used
against pro-choice marchers?”).  Yet, it does have a similar chastening effect on moral positions; it
argues powerfully for care and scrutiny when Internet regulation is proposed.  The claim is not that
regulating the Nazis marching through Skokie will cross a conceptual barrier and thus set us on a
slippery slope to book burning, but rather that the technological standards proposed to implement
individual regulatory initiatives will have unintended global consequences.  The universalizing move
comes from technology, not deontology: network effects, not Kantian hypotheticals.  This is an
important point in its own right.  It also suggests that the divisions between First Amendment scholars
may be transformed online.  Surprisingly, though, it has received practically no attention.  The work of
Larry Lessig is a signal exception.  See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE (1999).  I hope to develop this idea in a later work; for the moment, these asides will have
to take the place of developed argument.
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has leant its support to a continuing program of intellectual property expansion
in ways that seem both unwise and unconstitutional.
But why look at cyberspace in particular?  A myopic focus on a particular
medium is always suspect, and rightly so. In particular, why argue that online
intellectual property disputes will force courts to confront the unresolved
tensions between their intellectual property analyses and their First
Amendment analyses?  There are three main reasons.  First, in cyberspace,
intellectual property will be closer to the reader, the user, and the citizen than it
has ever been before.53  The acts that trigger intellectual property scrutiny, and
copying in particular, are the very heart of the networked environment.  They
have gone from being acts that an individual user has to work quite hard to
accomplish (setting type to reprint a book) to being acts that were within reach
(photocopying, taping) to being acts that it is almost impossible to avoid, at
least if one is to believe the Clinton Administration that even storing a
document in RAM or disk cache amounts to copying.  Intellectual property is
on the desktop, both literally and figuratively.
Second, the legal category of intellectual property will increasingly include
both familiar property rights and less familiar state-backed technologies of
control and surveillance, digital fences, universal ID’s, and so on.  This in turn
will heighten the tensions between intellectual property, privacy, and speech.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act is a fine example of the new genre.
Finally, the larger the network, the higher the stakes.  Paradoxically, the
very network effects that make alternative ways of supporting innovation
feasible have been seen by the Clinton Administration and by many of the
dominant content providers as a reason to extend their rights even further.  If
this process continues, the relationship—both positive and negative—between
intellectual property and speech will become clearer and clearer.  In this case,
political economy actually will make ideological contradiction manifest to the
meanest understanding.
The Clinton Administration’s intellectual property policies have been
astoundingly one-sided and poorly thought out.  Though the Administration
presents itself as cyber-savvy, these policies represent the absolute antithesis of
everything one should revere about the Internet, and indeed threaten to make
the Internet’s decentralized anonymous architecture seem like a bug rather
than a feature.  But I have to concede one point.  When it comes to exposing
the tensions between intellectual property and speech, the Clinton
Administration’s role may well prove to be pivotal—if entirely unintended.
53. See BOYLE, supra note 31, at 135-39; Litman, supra note 18, at 610–12.
